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Abstract: We use telephone survey data on charter boat anglers to estimate demand 
models to value snapper-grouper and king mackerel bag limits in the North Carolina for-
hire fishery. The telephone survey presents respondents with hypothetical situations 
about higher charter fees and lower snapper-grouper and king mackerel bag limits and 
asks about the number of trips they would take in each situation. Stated preference trip 
responses are used in a jointly estimated revealed and stated preference demand model. 
We find that reduction in the snapper-grouper bag limit from 15 fish to 7 fish would 
reduce the annual aggregate value of charter boat fishing by 29% due to quality effects. 
The reduction in the snapper-grouper bag limit would reduce the number of charter boat 
fishing trips by 25% and aggregate economic value an additional 25% million. 
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Policies that are used to address recreational overfishing are quotas, bag and size limits, 
area closures and, in extreme cases, fishery closures. Each of the policies can change the 
behavior of anglers and have beneficial impacts on fish populations.  Benefits can be 
assessed by analyzing the effect of fishing restrictions on the biomass and distribution of 
fish species and how that affects recreational fishing (e.g., Massey, Newbold, and 
Gentner 2006). The costs of the policies can include lost use value for recreational 
anglers, lost income for commercial fishing boats and charter/head boat captains, and lost 
expenditures for the supporting tourism industry.  Economic analysis of recreational 
fishing demand can be used to estimate costs of these management options on anglers, 
and any expected changes in their behavior can be used to further assess the impact on 
the charter boat sector and the local tourist economy.  
Literature 
While there is a large marine recreational demand literature, most of the research is 
focused on fishing modes other than the charter boat sector and those studies focusing on 
the charter boat sector consider economic impacts (e.g. Bohnsack et al. 2002) or employ 
bioeconomic models (Abbott and Wilen 2009; Abbott, Maharaj, and Wilen 2009). We 
know of only one previous study that considers the recreation value of charter boat 
anglers. Poor and Breece (2006) use the travel cost method with revealed and stated 
preference data to estimate the value of water quality improvements to Chesapeake Bay 
anglers. One limitation of using the travel cost method with charter boat trips is that many 4 
 
of these are overnight trips. Overnight trips typically have multiple purposes so that a 
standard travel cost method demand model likely overstates the value of the fishing 
experience (Parsons 2003).   
There is a relatively large literature that values catch rate changes. For example, 
Gillig, Ozuna, and Griffin (2000) and Gillig et al. (2003) use data from the Gulf of 
Mexico red snapper fishery. In the first paper the authors use the travel cost method and 
estimate the effects of increasing catch rates on trip behavior. Gillig et al. (2003) use 
contingent valuation and single-site travel cost methods to estimate the value of red 
snapper catch rates. Schuhmann (1998) and Whitehead and Haab (1999) use the random 
utility model to estimate the value of catch rates for species aggregates in the 
southeastern U.S. Numerous other studies in the gray literature have measured the value 
of catch rate changes (McConnell and Strand 1994; Hicks et al. 1999; Haab, Whitehead, 
and McConnell, 2001).  
Using the value of catch rate changes to proxy for the value of bag limit changes 
is problematic because, while all anglers can be affected by catch rate changes, only 
expert (or lucky) anglers are affected by bag limit changes. An increase in stock size that 
makes it more likely to catch a fish would affect all anglers almost equally. But, since a 
bag limit constrains the upper limit of the number of fish caught and kept, only those 
anglers who reach the upper limit are affected. While it is relatively straightforward to 
estimate the value of catch rates, it is much more difficult to estimate the value of bag 
limits. As such, the value of bag limit changes has been estimated in only a few studies.  5 
 
Using the travel cost method, McConnell, Strand, and Blake-Hedges (1995) 
estimate harvest rates from a household production model to use as independent variables 
in a random utility model. The effect of bag limits are simulated by capping expected 
catch rates at the limit. Economic values are obtained by comparing the value of utility 
with and without bag limits. One difficulty with this approach is that the data may not 
support reliable estimation of the model. First, historical catch rates must be statistically 
related to individual catch rates. Second, the predicted catch rate for each angler at each 
site must be statistically related to angler site selection. Whitehead et al. (2010) find that 
only one of four single species models supported by the Marine Recreational Fishery 
Statistical Survey can be used to value bag limits.  
A number of other studies have estimated the value of bag limits with stated 
preference methods. Carson, Hanemann, and Steinberg (1990) estimate the value of a 
stamp that allows increases in the bag limits for king salmon using the contingent 
valuation method. Oh et al. (2005) use a choice experiment to value increases in red 
drum bag limits in Texas. Stoll and Ditton (2006) use the contingent valuation method to 
value bluefin tuna bag limits in North Carolina. Whitehead (2006) compares a random 
utility model using the McConnell, Strand, and Blake-Hedges method with a contingent 
valuation method estimate of the willingness-to-pay to avoid king mackerel bag limits.  
In contrast to previous research, we estimate a joint revealed and stated preference 
trip taking model and use the results to value the economic costs of bag limits incurred by 
anglers on charter boat trips. Since there are no existing data that would describe how 
anglers might respond to reductions in bag limits, stated preference data are necessary to 6 
 
help develop estimates of the benefits and costs of alternative fishery policies. The stated 
preference data are combined with revealed preference data to assess behavior beyond the 
range of historical experience while attenuating bias associated with behavioral intentions 
data (Whitehead et al. 2008). We avoid the problem of multiple purpose and overnight 
trips by asking respondents how many charter boat trips they would take with an increase 
in the charter boat fee. Since the increased fee is an increase in the marginal cost, the 
willingness to pay for the charter trips is a marginal willingness to pay.  
Data 
During the 2007 fishing season surveyors approached charter boat and head boat 
passengers at the end of a fishing trip and interviewed them at marinas and fishing 
centers from Dare County, NC, to Brunswick County, NC. At the conclusion of the peak 
fishing season a follow-up telephone survey was conducted of passengers to collect 
information on all for-hire and other saltwater fishing trips taken that season and the 
geographic distribution of trips. The dockside field survey of passengers produced 1317 
usable surveys, and the telephone follow-up survey of passengers produced 296 
completed surveys (Dumas et al. 2009). 
Relative to the full sample, phone survey respondents are more likely to have 
been on a trip with the primary purpose of fishing when intercepted and are more avid in 
terms of the number of annual trips as reported on the intercept survey. Sixty percent of 
phone survey respondents were on a trip for the primary purpose of fishing, while only 
46% of nonrespondents were on a primary purpose trip. Phone survey respondents took 
an average of 4 charter and head boat trips during the past 12 months, while 7 
 
nonrespondents took an average of 3 trips. We constructed weights with the trips and 
purpose variables so that the phone survey sub-sample reflects the avidity of the onsite 
sample. Eighty-eight percent of the phone sample is male and 96% are white. The 
average age is 46 and average income is $76 thousand. We discard anglers who do not 
plan to take charter trips during the 12 months following the phone survey. We adjust the 
weights for this subsample so that the sum of the weights is equal to the sample size. Of 
the 296 anglers from the on-site survey who participated in the phone survey, 244 
provided enough information to estimate recreation demand models. 
During the phone survey respondents are asked about the number of marine 
recreational fishing trips taken during the past 12 months with 5 modes of fishing (charter 
boat, head boat, private boat, pier and beach) across 8 coastal counties. The average 
number of trips across all modes is 7.55. The average number of charter boat trips is 1.93, 
head boat trips is 0.11, private boat trips is 1.64, pier trips is 0.84, and beach fishing trips 
is 3.04. Dare County beach (1.68) and charter (1.52) trips are the most common in the 
sample. A few respondents reported a large number of fishing trips. In order to reduce the 
influence of outliers, we top-code each mode/county trip variable at 30. 
We ask respondents hypothetical questions about charter trips that they expect to 
take during the next 12 months (denoted the SP0 trip), charter trips during the next 12 
months with either a $50 or $100 increase in the charter fee, charter trips during the next 
12 months with an 8 fish decrease in the snapper-grouper bag limit (SP2), and charter and 
other fishing trips during the next 12 months with a 2 fish decrease in the king mackerel 
bag limit (SP3) (see appendix for the text of these questions).  8 
 
In table 1 we summarize the responses. During the past 12 months respondents 
took 1.93 charter boat trips. Respondents state that they will take 1.99 charter trips during 
the next 12 months. With higher charter fees, 78 respondents state that they will take 
fewer charter trips. Of these 78 respondents, 48 report that they would take zero charter 
boat trips, and the mean trips for this group falls from 2.29 to 0.85. The average number 
of trips for the full sample of 244 falls to 1.52. Charter trips decrease with the eight fish 
reduction in snapper-grouper bag limits. All of the 60 anglers who state that they target 
snapper-grouper state that they will take 0 trips in the future with the bag limit reduction. 
The average number of trips for the full sample falls to 1.45.  Charter trips also decrease 
with lower king mackerel bag limits, but the effect is slight. The average number of trips 
for the full sample of 244 falls to 1.86, only a 6% change from the status quo. Of the 96 
anglers who state that they target king mackerel, 24 state that they will take fewer charter 
trips, with 12 stating their charter trips will be 0. The average number of trips for the 96 
targeting anglers falls from 2.02 to 1.70, a 16% change. 
We asked several debriefing questions. The first was “Now that the hypothetical 
questions are over, how sure are you about your answers?  Are you very sure, somewhat 
sure, or not sure at all?” Ninety percent of all respondents stated that they were very sure 
about their answers. We next asked, “When you answered the hypothetical trip questions, 
did you tell us the number of trips that you would hope to take in the future or the number 
of trips that you really think you will be able to take in the future?” Eighty percent stated 
that the stated preference trips were those that they really thought they would take. 
Finally, “Do you think your answers to the hypothetical questions are good enough for 
scientists to use to provide good information for fishery management decisions?” Ninety 9 
 
percent thought that their answers were good enough for supporting fishery management 
decisions. 
Empirical Model and Results 
Consider a choice situation where y is the number of charter boat trips and x is a vector of 
independent variables. Separate revealed and stated preference models would involve two 
equations: 
  s s s s s









,                                                                                   (1) 
where α and β are coefficients to be estimated, ε is the error term, and r, s indicate 
revealed and stated preference data.  
When jointly estimating the revealed and stated preference data, it is stacked and 
combined into a single equation. If the revealed and stated preference data coefficients 
are constrained to be equal, then the basic model is estimated: 
  s r s r s r s r s r x y , ,
'
, , ,       .                                                                           (2) 
This framework is typically naïve in that revealed and stated preference data diverge for 
various reasons. The first-order test for divergence is to allow the intercepts to vary: 
  s r s r s r x SP y , , , '         .                                                                      (3) 10 
 
The γ regression coefficient allows a test for compatibility between the data formats. If γ 
is statistically insignificant, then the model collapses to the basic model in equation (2), 
and the revealed and stated preference data are compatible. If γ is statistically significant, 
then the revealed and stated preference intercepts are     r  and       s , 
respectively.  
Since recreation trips are count data consisting of non-negative integers, we use a 
fixed effects Poisson panel data model that was first used in this context by Englin and 
Cameron (1996):  
  it t i it x y       '  .                                                                                      (4) 
The fixed effects model employs an implicit individual-specific constant term,  i  , i = 1, 
…, n.  The independent variables are those that change across time for each individual, 
t x . In contrast, the more commonly used random effects model includes a common 
constant term,  , and allows estimation of the individual specific variables,  i z  (see 
Landry and Liu 2011). If individual specific variables are correlated with the variables 
that are time specific then the coefficients on the random effects model coefficients may 
be inconsistent. An advantage of the fixed effects model is that it avoids this 
inconsistency. An advantage of the random effects model is that it allows estimation of 
the effects of individual specific variables. Random effects models can also be more 
efficient. In the current application we employ the fixed effects model because the 
coefficients of the typical individual specific variables employed in this type of model; 11 
 
i.e., travel cost and income, are not significantly different from zero. All other results are 
similar across models.  
The fixed effects demand model is presented in table 2. The dependent variable is 
the number of charter boat fishing trips. The independent variables are the increased 
charter boat fishing fee, the reductions in bag limits, and a stated preference dummy 
variable. We find that higher fees and the reduction in snapper grouper bag limits will 
reduce charter boat fishing trips. The reduced king mackerel bag limit does not 
significantly reduce the number of trips in this model or in one that includes only those 
anglers who target king mackerel. The revealed and stated preference intercept variables 
are not significantly different indicated that the revealed and stated preference data do not 
diverge. 
The willingness-to-pay value (WTP) per trip is estimated as the negative inverse 
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The WTP value per trip for a one-fish reduction in the bag limit is the negative of the 
coefficient on the bag limit divided by the coefficient on the higher fee variable:  
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The WTP estimates are presented in table 3. The WTP per angler per trip is $273. The 
WTP per angler per trip to avoid a one fish reduction in the snapper-grouper bag limit is 12 
 
$10. Anglers would be willing to pay $80 to avoid the reduction in the snapper-grouper 
bag limit from 15 fish to 7 fish. 
Conclusions 
In addition to the economic impacts of for-hire passengers' expenditures on the coastal 
economy, passengers also enjoy economic value from the fishing experience.  WTP is the 
economic value of the fishing experience to the passenger beyond the expenditures 
necessary to take the trip.  We find that higher charter fees and lower snapper-grouper 
bag limits will reduce the quality of trips, the number of trips, and the economic value in 
the North Carolina charter boat fishery. With about 303,000 annual passenger trips in 
North Carolina (Dumas et al. 2009), the annual aggregate value of the North Carolina 
charter boat fishery is $83 million (with a 95% confidence interval of $44 and $122 
million). The reduction in the snapper-grouper bag limit from 15 fish to 7 fish, a trip 
quality effect, would reduce the annual aggregate value by $24 million (the 95% 
confidence interval is $12 to $36 million), 29% of the total value. The reduction in the 
snapper-grouper bag limit would reduce charter boat fishing trips by 25% and aggregate 
economic value an additional $21 million, 25% of the total. The total reduction in annual 
aggregate value is $45 million, 54% of the total.  Future research should compare 
estimates of the cost of bag limits estimated here to the economic benefits to determine if 
they are economically efficient.  13 
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Table 1 
Revealed and Stated Preference Charter Boat Trip Data  
Trips Scenario  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
RP: Past 12 months  1.93  4.64 
SP0: Status quo next 12 months  1.99  2.07 
SP1: Increased charter fee  1.52  1.90 
SP2: Decreased snapper-grouper bag limit  1.45  1.97 
SP3: Decreased king mackerel bag limit  1.86  2.09 
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Table 2 
Revealed and Stated Preference Fixed Effects Demand Model
a 
Independent Variables  Mean  Coefficient  t-ratio 
Increase in the charter fee (=0, $50, $100)  14.91  -0.0037  -4.15 
Snapper-grouper bag limit (=7, 15)  13.40  0.0367  4.27 
King mackerel bag limit (=1, 3)  2.60  0.0275  0.85 
Stated preference data (=0, 1)  0.80  0.009  0.147 
LLF   -996.27 
AIC   1.64 
Cases   244 
Periods   5 
 
aDependent variable: Charter boat fishing trips   19 
 
Table 3 
Willingness-to-Pay Estimates (per angler) 
 WTP  t-ratio 
Trip $273.11  4.15 
One fish change in snapper-grouper bag limit (per trip)  $10.03  3.85 
One fish change in king mackerel bag limit (per trip)  $7.52  0.92 
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Appendix. Stated Preference Charter Boat Trip Questions 
Now think about the saltwater fishing trips you might take next year in North Carolina.  
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability.   
About how many saltwater fishing trips do you think you will take during the next 12 
months in North Carolina? About how many of these saltwater fishing trips would be 
charter boat trips?   
Suppose the cost of your portion of the charter fee increases by ($50/$100) because of a 
fuel surcharge.  For example, if you paid $250 for your portion of the charter fee during 
the past 12 months, during the next 12 months you would pay ($300/$350). If your 
charter fee was ($50/$100) higher, would you take more, fewer, or the same number of 
charter trips during the next 12 months? How many more/fewer charter trips would you 
take?  
Many fish species in North Carolina are overfished for a variety of reasons.  The South 
Atlantic Fishery Management Council, an agency that regulates North Carolina offshore 
fishing, is expected to consider tighter recreational bag limits in the future.  For the next 
several questions, consider how tighter bag limits will affect you.  Assume that the costs 
of charter fishing trips are not higher due to a fuel surcharge.   
The current bag limit for many snapper species is 10 snapper per person per day.  The 
current bag limit for many grouper species is 5 grouper per person per day.  Suppose new 
bag limits of 5 snapper and 2 grouper per person per day are put into place before your 
next charter fishing trip.  All other bag limits remain the same.  Considering the new bag 21 
 
limits, would you take more, fewer, or the same number of charter fishing trips during the 
next 12 months? How many more/fewer charter trips would you take? 
The current bag limit for king mackerel is 3 king mackerel per person per day.  Suppose a 
new bag limit of 1 king mackerel per person per day is put into place before your next 
charter fishing trip.  All other bag limits remain the same.  Considering the new bag limit, 
would you take more, fewer or the same number of charter fishing trips during the next 
12 months? How many more/fewer charter trips would you take? 